Vinod C. Khanna is a former Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies. As a member of the Indian Foreign Service, he was India's Ambassador to Cuba, Indonesia, and Bhutan. During his diplomatic career, he handled several responsibilities relating to Sino-Indian relations. After his retirement, he served as the first Head of the India Taipei Association which looks after India's interests in Taiwan.
He has a reputation as one of the premier diplomats produced by India and is considered an expert on China with him also serving as a founder member of the China Study Group and having been a member of the Editorial Board of China Report. He’s also written books regarding South-East Asian dynamics and there are few better sources that can match his expertise.
1. Ambassador, you have had a well-earned reputation as the "sinologist", China has been a key focus for you over the years as an IFS officer and then later as part of the Institute of Chinese Studies, what do you think brought about this recent escalation?
As I mentioned when you first so kindly approached me, I have retired long ago. I cannot any longer claim any specialized knowledge. For what it is worth I will attempt to answer your questions to the best of my present ability. I am afraid you will not find anything very original in it.
Though I do not have precise details of what happened in Galwan Valley, I think the combination of the following factors brought about the recent escalation which has also been manifested in other vulnerable spots like the Pangong Tso:
i. Under Xi Jinping China today is very conscious of its immense economic power and the military capability which it has acquired. As often happens in international relations, this has tempted it to be increasingly assertive.
ii. Despite a large number of agreements starting with the ‘Peace and tranquillity’ agreement of 1993, in the absence of an agreement on the precise delineation of the Line of Actual Control, there has always been a potential for trouble. As usual, each side accused the other of having crossed over to the adversary’s side [though PM has caused some confusion].
iii. India has quite rightly been strengthening its infrastructure, including building a road which in many places is close to LAC and viewed by China as threatening their dominant position.
iv. There is always a possibility of some mistake by either the Indian or Chinese troops on the spot with retaliation by the other. We have always to remember that they are operating in very difficult circumstances and rare moments of human error are always possible.
v. Perhaps most importantly, China has not taken kindly to the decision of the Indian govt. last year to change the status of J & K, particularly the insistence of Mr.Amit Shah in Parliament that not only POK but also Aksai Chin belonged to India and India will do it best to recover it. Some in Chinese leadership would have taken it as a threat not in keeping with the so-called ‘Wuhan spirit.’
2. Where do you see this leading into and what according to you would be an appropriate foreign policy response?
Two different though inter-related questions.
As far as the first question is concerned, what has made this a somewhat difficult question is the fact that 20 Indian soldiers died and the repeated assertion that ‘their death will not go in vain’. I have no idea what that means. In fact, I got the impression from PM’s somewhat confusing statement that he was trying to say that our soldiers had already given a befitting reply. With both sides declaring victory, there will be no loss of face and the two sides could now turn to peaceful negotiations both at military and diplomatic level, leading to mutual disengagement. But I am not at all sure .though this seems to be the high probability scenario.
A former commander of Indian Army’s Northern Command, Lt. Gen. HS Panag wrote recently,
“Much as I would like to speculate about China’s broader political aims, the direct political aim is simple — to maintain the “status quo” along the LAC on its own terms, which is to forestall any threat, howsoever remote, to Aksai Chin and NH 219.”
An appropriate foreign policy demands, as you know, going through various options and selecting what both promotes national interests and is feasible. I do not think either side wants further military escalation though there can be unintended consequences of some actions [triggered by hyper nationalism]. Nor do I think much of the economic boycott which in all probability will do more harm to India than to China. The only exception to this would be steps to ensure as little involvement as possible of any foreign [which naturally includes China but not limited to it] involvement in a few highly sensitive areas,
In the long term, effective foreign policy response requires that India greatly strengthen its economy. How that has to happen is an entirely different issue. IN the meanwhile basic negotiating position has to be to ensure that both sides abide by the commitments to the whole series of agreements designed to ensure peace along the border. This has to be backed by adequate military capability. Quite apart from the border, there are a large number of areas of cooperation both at bilateral and multilateral level with China which are mutually beneficial and which should be persisted with once tempers cool down.
Naturally, at the same time, India has to work in close partnership—not military alliances—with the many countries who face, in one way or another, a similar challenge from China.e.g. Vietnam, Indonesia, etc.
In short, we should persist with basically the same foreign policy that India has pursued in recent years under various PMs. I do not agree with those who say we should change our policy with respect to Tibet, and Taiwan, [though I would have recommended Taiwan’s presence at the World Health Assembly as an observer with same designation as in Olympics].
3.One of your many articles back in 2001 talks about the Chinese diaspora and how it has been defined in terms of what all subsections does it extend to. How do recent escalations play out with respect to SARs such as Hong Kong or Macau?
I do not think the recent developments in India-China relations will have any significant impact on Hong Kong or Macau.
However, there is one important facet of India-HK relations about which I am not clear. Recently GOI revised FDI policy rules stating that any nonresident entity of a country which shares a land border with India [meaning largely China] or where the beneficial owner of investment into India is situated in or is a citizen of any such country can invest only under the government route. In other words, government approval is required for such investments.
Now, I am not clear whether it impacts investments from HK which are quite large. HK it is treated as a separate jurisdiction for transaction and tax purposes. India has an independent tax treaty with Hong Kong and investments coming from the region are recorded separately from that of China. Experts believe that investments from Hong Kong will not be impacted if the territory is treated separately from China. Hong Kong does not share a land border with India. It would be unwise to take any steps to adversely impact HK 's FDI but I really do not know.
4. In your book "India and China: The Way Ahead After "Mao's India War" ", you claim that "India-China relations are not an all-or-nothing proposition, but a mixed bag of issues with varying degrees of solvibility." Does that still hold? and if so what are the things India should be working towards?
Yes, I think so. MY answer to the second question would already have indicated that. Though theoretically, a solution to the border problem is available, in practice we may have for some time to be content with the present set of agreements. Some of these were arrived at after we wrote what you have quoted above in 1999-2000. Again, there are a whole set of other issues economic , political, diplomatic, which are partially solvable and that has been the general direction. Though there has also been the occasional setback e.g. mentioned above on the FDI front.
5. Post your unforeseen voluntary retirement, you were sent to Taipei, not officially as India's representative but you took up pretty much that role heading up the India-Taipei vertical. Do you think that mutual understanding of India's relationships with Taiwan has changed in China? (How)(Why)
I am not sure I quite understand your question. In the same sentence, you speak of ‘mutual understanding’ [presumably meaning that of India and China] and ‘in China.’ As far as the concept of sovereign state is concerned then as now, we subscribed to the ‘Once China Principle’. On the other hand, there has been much development in India-Taiwan relations, especially in the economic field since my days. Beijing is quite accustomed to these kinds of relationships between Taiwan and various other countries. But it continues to be very sensitive about certain issues which it regards as central to the ‘One China principle.’ For instance, it would certainly break diplomatic relations with any country which had an ‘embassy/ ambassador’ in Taipei. There are some grey areas.
6. You had headed the East Asia Division of the MEA - which dealt with China - during some of the most critical phases of normalization of Sino-Indian relations after the 1962 border war, had served in Hong Kong, learning Mandarin at the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and were posted to Beijing to pick up the pieces, as it were, of the turmoil that this revolution had left in its wake. Are all those experiences key to your eminence as an expert on China?
First some minor details. I was in HK as a Language trainee from Oct 1964 to June 1966 , and in Beijing from June ’66 to Aug’68. It was during my stay in Beijing and not HK that GPCR got into full swing. I then served as an Under Secretary in East Asia Division from ’68-‘71’ This period..’64 to ’71 can certainly not be described as part of any ‘critical phase of normalization’ though Mrs. Gandhi did drop a hint about her desire to move in that direction. After serving successively in Japan and Germany I returned to E.A. Div in 1978 by which time the process of normalization had begun with Mrs Gandhi sending Mr K.R. Narayanan to Beijing as Ambassador. From ’78 to ’81 I did play a small part in the process of normalization. But wherever I was from 1964 onwards I continued to be a student of Chinese affairs. To describe that as ‘eminence as an expert’ would be an exaggeration.
7. An incident from one of the many postings that sticks with you?
Naturally, thanks to a 30-year career—32, if you add the two years in Taipei—many incidents ‘stick’ with me, none of them earth-shaking. Let me mention five:
i. Siege of our Beijing embassy.in June 1967
ii. Standing ovations by Chinese audiences after Indian classical dance performances during a tour in October-November 1978 by Indian cultural delegation which I was accompanying as an advisor.
iii. As the head of E.A. Div, negotiating with Chinese in complete secrecy for the safe return of an Indian army platoon which had by mistake entered the Chumbi Valley.
iv. Talks with Fidel Castro
v. Arriving in Taipei in March 1995 to function, for all intents and purposes, as India’s representative without all the normal diplomatic codes and immunities laid down by the Vienna Convention, etc. and a rather tenuous connection with the MEA to begin with.
8. In the case that things do devolve, Can India count on the support of major powers, especially given the advent of COVID-19? Your perspective could shed valuable light.
I am not quite sure what kind of a situation you have in mind.
In the event of a large-scale Himalayan conflict, US intelligence and surveillance could help India get a clearer picture of the battlefield. Maybe some acceleration of delivery of weaponry. But most countries will maintain a neutral stance. India has to deal with difficult situations by itself. It is large and strong enough to do so. Obviously, at all times we should endeavour to avoid any large scale military conflict.
9. Something a little unrelated to the heaviness of the previous discussion, your book "Ramayana in Indonesia" talks about how Indian culture exists in many forms in many places, do you think that this common culture aids in some sort of South-East Asian Cohesion?
I am flattered that one of you has read at least part of the ‘Ramayana in Indonesia’ co-authored by me. In that book we cite a well-known scholar, Resnick, who has this to say about the impact of the Ramayana in S.E. Asia, “ the availability of a single great myth as a source of inspiration for literature, ballet and drama is a uniting force of the first order” And, of course, Ramayana was part of a bigger package. But having said that I do not wish to overstate the role of Indian culture. There are other factors as well as contributing to what you refer to as ‘South-East Asian Cohesion.’
An illuminating exchange with a jewel of the Indian Foreign Service that has touched on topics as vast as Mr Khanna’s eminence on these subjects. It was an absolute pleasure to pick the brains of an expert such as him and we hope that extends onto our viewers as well.
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